COMMENT
CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS IN ILLINOIS
LEWIs C. MURTAUGH*

ROMISES which lack a consideration have been so frequently enforced on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel that it is
fruitless to tilt with the question of whether such a doctrine should
be recognized.' The question of the extent to which the doctrine will be
allowed to supersede the requirement of consideration for the enforcement
of promises is one that it may confidently be predicted will be worked out
only in the greatest confusion in which the elements of consideration,
estoppel and promissory estoppel may be expected to be confused and
misnamed.2

In the van in creating such legal bedlam are the cases enforcing the payment of promised sums to charities. 3 To those familiar either with history
or with current events, it is a commonplace that the policy of nations
towards charities, especially religious institutions, varies. In this country
charities seem to be in universal favor and the courts have gone to great
extent to make this clear.4 Their extent and growth is a matter of common
knowledge.
* Member of the Illinois bar.

x See i Williston, Contracts § 139 (2d ed. 1936); also Cardozo, J., in Allegheny College v.
National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
2 Estoppel may arise if there is justifiable detrimental reliance upon a representation of fact;
promissory estoppel when there is justifiable detrimental reliance upon the performance of a
promise. If the i.ct done by the promisee is bargained for as a return for the promise, it may be
consideration. The mere performance of a condition, however detrimental, attached to a
gratuitous promise is not consideration. See z Williston, Contracts § 139 (2d ed. 1936).
Interesting cases of real estoppel based upon a promise are Golden v. Cervenka, 278 1. 4o9,116 N.E. 273 (1917), and Niblack v. Farley, 286 Ill. 536, 540, 122 N.E. 16o (1919), in which

notes given to a bank without consideration to create the appearance of assets were enforced
by the receiver on the dosing of the bank. For a comment on an "injurious reliance" theory
for enforcing all promises, see Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 578 (1933).
3 For an analysis and citation of authority on charitable subscriptions generally, see i Williston, Contracts § 1i6 (2d ed. 1936); T. C. Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable
Subscriptions, 12 Corn. L. Q. 467 (1927), reprinted in American Law School Association,
Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts 542 (1931); and extended notes in 38 A.L.R. 868
(1925) and 95 A.L.R. 1305 (1935).
4 Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Harris, 359 Ill. 86, 194 N.E. 250
(1935), and cases cited therein.
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One of the commonest means by which their continuance and growth is
effectuated is by the subscription drive. s This results in the charity having
large amounts of promises represented by notes or subscription agreements of various sorts. On the performance of these promises, charities
sometimes depend for their very existence, sometimes for their growth.6
The courts have generally been very willing to see that these expectations
are not frustrated by a change of heart on the part of the promisor or by

his untimely death.7 Although such promises have been enforced for a
great variety of reasons, the favored device has been by the application of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Even when other elements of the
alleged contract were enlarged upon, the courts have usually made the
promissory estoppel element part and parcel of their decision. Thus, because of such frequent enforcement, it has been suggested 8 that the
promissory estoppel section of the Restatement of Contracts 9 should have
been supplemented by a rule of law that a written subscription to a char-

ity should not be invalid or unenforceable for want of consideration.
However, such a rule of law can almost be reached by a sympathetic
definition of the reliance necessary for promissory estoppel. For in many
states, reliance seems to be that measure of reliance upon the promise to
make a gift to charity which actually was taken by the charity before the
court. Such a sophisticated conclusion may be supported by decisions
finding the necessary reliance in the obtaining of subscriptions, in the
subscriptions of others or in the mere continued existence of the charity,
as well as the more obvious building of a church or school.o In a recent
s Promises obtained in a subscription drive differ from isolated promises in that the latter
lack a possible consideration arising from other subscriptions, or from the labor of obtaining
other subscriptions. Frequently, too, a subscription is for a more definite purpose the accomplishment of which is easily denominated reliance. For these reasons and because they are by
far the commonest sort of promises which have reached the courts, only subscription promises
are considered herein, unless specially designated otherwise.
6The cases seem not to have discussed the worth of continuance of particular charities or
to question the value of expansion of their activities.
7 See, generally, authorities cited in note 3 supra. For Illinois cases see note i6 infra. It
seems always to have been presumed that the charity has reasonably relied on the promised
sum unless the promise was withdrawn before reliance. See note 35 infra.
8
T. C. Billig, op. cit. supra note 3, at 480.

9 Rest., Contracts § 90 (1932): "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
zoSee note 3 supra for authorities generally. Note that the reliance referred to is present
in any subscription case.
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Illinois Appellate Court decision,"' the relatively ascetic conceptions of the
earlier Illinois cases on promissory estoppel were broadened to include almost all of these "reliances.
The Illinois cases without recognizing the term have clearly relied upon
a promissory estoppel principle in sustaining charitable 13 and non-charitable 4 subscriptions, s even though oftentimes there was a definitely recognizable consideration for the subscription.z6 Sometimes there were clearly
7
mutual promises between subscribers for the benefit of the charity."
Promises of subscribers to each other might be consideration without the
necessity of any mention of promissory estoppel,'8 but usually the court
has brought in the point of reliance. 9
The content of the promissory estoppel doctrine was not subjected to
much analysis until the courts were confronted with sets of facts which in
112

11In re Estate of Wheeler, 284 Ill. App. 132, I N.E. (2d) 425 (1936). No attempt to secure
a further review was made.
12 The labor of obtaining subscriptions, however, was not relied upon.
13Robertson v. March, 3 Scam. (4 111.) 198 (1841); Pryor v. Cain, 25 Ill. 263 (i86i); Griswold v. Trustees of Peoria University, 26 Ill. 41 (i86i); Johnston v. Ewing Female University,
35 Ill. Si8 (1864); Trustees v. Garvey, 53 Ill. 40 (1870); Snell v. Trustees, 58 Ill. 290 (1871);
Whitsitt v. Trustees, I10 Ili. 1.25 (z884); Hudson v. Green Hill Seminary, 113 Ill. 618 (1885);
Beatty v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N.E. 432 (1898).
14Cross v. Pinckneyville Steam Co., 17 Ill. 54 (1855); Thompson v. Board of Supervisors,
40 Ill. 379 (i866); McClure v. Wilson, 43 Ill. 356 (1867); Miller v. Ballard, 46 Ill. 377 (i868);
Hall v. Virginia, 91 Ill. 535 (1879); Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Military Encampment Co., 140 Il.
248, 29 N.E. 1o44 (1892); Grubbs v. Kelly, 14 9 Ill. App. 550 (i9og). Regarding preincorporation promises to subscribe generally, see i Williston, Contracts § 118 (2d ed. 1936).
IsAs in the Restatement, note io supra, no distinction was made between charitable and
non-charitable subscriptions.
16Thompson v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Ill. 379 (i866); Hall v. Virginia, 91 Ill. 535 (1879);
(relocation of a county seat), McClure v. Wilson, 43 Ill. 356 (1867) (escaping Civil War
draft); Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Military Encampment Co., 140 1. 248, 29 N.E. io44 (1892), and
Miller v. Ballard, 46 Ill. 377 (1868) (securing a convention); Grubbs v. Kelly, 149 Ill. App. 550
(i9o9) (securing a new industry and railroad for the town).
17Whitsitt v. Trustees, iio Ill. 125 (1884). In some of the cases, especially where noncharitable subscriptions were involved, the agreements might have been so construed.
18Tonica & Petersburg Railroad Co. v. McNeely, 21 Ill. 71 (1859); see Chicago Bank of
Commerce v. Kraft, 269 Ill. App. 295 (1933).
'9 Thus, in Whitsitt v. Trustees, iio Ill. 125 (x884), the court said at page 131, "It has often
been held, in the case of mutual subscriptions for a common object, and there has been expenditure of money in the accomplishment of the object, that a subscription is binding as a valid
contract, expenditures having been made on account thereof."
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the courts' eyes did not merit recovery.20 In Prattv. Trustees,2 the promisor died before the purchase of a bell, which was to be paid for in part by
the sum he had promised. The court held that since no action had been
taken, death revoked the offer and there was no liability.- In Beach v.
First M.E. Church,)3 the same result was reached when insanity of the
promisor intervened before the construction of a church was begun.
Again, in an appellate court case 2 4 a subscriber withdrew before the commencement of the work of remodeling, the expenses of which he had promised to defray in part, and the court refused to hold him liable. The court
denied that the labors of the pastor in getting the necessary subscriptions
were sufficient reliance. The court considered that an earlier case2s to the
contrary could not stand in view of the later cases just discussed. Since
this element of labor is always present and this consideration has not been
6
relied upon successfully since that time, the conclusion seems justified.2
The case of Beatty v. Western College'7 reinforced the principle of the
Beach and Pratt cases and in addition clarified the legal situation. The
court disregarded an expressed consideration in the note on the ground
that the proof tended to show that the note was a gift or donationS and
that such promises were enforced only "if money has been expended or
liabilities have been incurred which by legal necessity must cause loss or
injury to the person so expending money or incurring liability, if the note
20 Illinois cases denying recovery to charities are Pratt v. Trustees, 93 Ill.
475 (1879);
Beach v. First Methodist Church, 96 Il. 177 (x88o); Augustine v. Trustees of Methodist
Episcopal Society, 79 Ill.
App. 452 (I898); Cutwright v. Preachers Aid Society, 271 Il.App.
i68 (1933). To these might be added Kelly v. Dyer,_359 Ill.
46, 194 N.E. 255 (1935), although an inspection of the briefs indicates that the argument was not based upon the fact
that the promisee was a charity.
2'93 Ill.
475 (1879).

"Id. at 478: "Where notes are given by way of voluntary subscription, to raise a fund or
promote an object, they are open to the defence of a want of consideration, unless money has
been expended, or liabilities incurred which, by a legal necessity, must cause loss or injury to
the person so expending money, or incurring liability, if the notes are not paid ..... It is the
expending of money, etc., or incurring of legal liability, on the faith of the promise, which
gives the right of action, and without this there is no right of action."
'396 Ill.
177 (88o).

24Augustine v. Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Society, 79 Ill.
App. 452 (1898).
2sKentucky Baptist Education Society v. Carter, 72 IIl. 247 (1874).
26The court, in Cutwright v. Preachers Aid Society, 271 Ill. App. x68 (933), denied thai
either the labor of obtaining subscriptions or the subscriptions themselves were consideration.
'7 177 Ill. 280, 52 N.E. 532 (i898). Recovery was allowed because a building had been built
in the expectation that the sum promised would be available to pay for it.
28 See i Williston, Contracts 1x6 (2d ed. 1936).
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is not paid. ' ' 29 In such cases, said the court, "The gift will be upheld upon
the ground of estoppel and not by reason of any valid consideration in
the original undertaking. ' 3° The opinion, by recognizing that reliance
was not consideration, and that the enforcement of these promises was not
based on contract principles did a great deal to clarify both the law of
contracts and of charitable subscriptions in this state.
The seeming simplicity of promissory estoppel as limited by the opinions, however, is deceiving. If the charity procures a subscription on the
basis of which it builds a building, the case for recovery is clear. Suppose
the contract for the structure is signed but the building is not begun or has
just begun when the promise of the sum was withdrawn. The liability incurred, the measure of damages of the church to the contractor would be
considerably smaller than the full cost of the building. This would seem
to be the measure of reliance also on a quantum meruit basis. Yet, the
usual terminology that the promisor is estopped to plead lack of consideration would indicate that full recovery on the promise could be made.
There are apparently no decisiofis allowing only a partial recovery. 3'
Even though no actual liability was incurred or expenditure made which
the performance of the promise was intended to cover, it would seem
reasonable to allow recovery by the charity in at least one class of cases.
Suppose A promises a charity the sum necessary to build a school and
B promises the charity the sums necessary to maintain it. It would be
almost useless to enforce one without enforcing the other. The building of
the school should clearly be enough reliance for both promises. The occurrence of considerable future liabilities and expenditures, even though not
contracted for as yet, is so predictable that when the action giving rise to
29Beatty

v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 293, 52 N.E. 432, 435 (1898).
so Ibid. The court also adopted the following language from Simpson Centenary v. Tuttle,
71 Iowa 596,599,33 N.W. 74, 75 (1887): "Where a note, howeyer, is based on a promise to give
for the support of the objects referred to (founding a school, church or other institution of
similar character), it may still be open to this defense, (want of consideration), unless it shall
appear that the donee has, prior to any revocation, entered into engagements or made expenditures based on such promise, so that he must suffer loss or injury if the note is not aid. This
is based on the equitable principle that, after allowing the donee to incur obligations on the
faith that the note would be paid, the donor should be estopped from pleading want of consideration."
31 It has been urged that, although the extent of reliance, rather than expectation, is an appropriate measure of damages for some contracts, charitable subscriptions should nevertheless be dealt with on the basis of expectations. Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Element in
Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373, 405 (1936-37). There are, however, dicta that the
amount of reliance measures the recovery. Pryor v. Cain, 25 Ill. 262, 265 (i86I); Miller v.
Ballard, 46 Ill.
377, 380 (i868). Cf. Alexander Hamilton Institute v. Jones, 234 Ill App. 444
(1924).
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the liabilities has been undertaken in reliance upon a promise to defray
them, there seems as much reason for enforcing this payment as for enforcing payment to defray the cost of the building itself. This result was
reached in an early appellate court case.32 A promise to the endowment
fund of a school not yet started but made to induce its foundation was
enforced when the college was founded, teachers hired and other expenditures were made on the faith of the endowment fund of which the note
33
formed a part.
Suppose the promise to maintain the school was made after the school
was built and in operation. The existence of the liabilities would not have
been caused by any reliance upon the promise and without more it would
seem clear that liability should be denied. The mere expectation of a new
source of revenue would seem to be in the same class as the expectations
in the unbuilt church3 4 and the unbought bell cases. 35 Yet, this seems to
have been denied by the appellate court in the recent case already men6
tioned.3
In that case a promise was made to bequeath a sum to the endowment
of a church, the income of which was to be used to meet its ordinary current expenses. No interest was paid by the promisor, who died twelve
years later. The church was already built and prospering and it was to
assure the continuity of its operation that the endowment fund drive had
been undertaken. In 1918 the income of the endowment fund contributed
about two per cent of the current income. In 1933 the income of the fund
was almost thirty per cent of the total income. This was, of course, largely
due to the drive which had brought large sums into the fund. However
true to the prediction which caused the founding of the fund, the current
contributions declined during the same period, although the membership
increased. The court allowed the charity to recover even though there
was no reference to any additional activities undertaken in reliance upon
37
the fund as a means of support.
Friedline v. Board of Trustees,

23 Ill. App. 494 (1887).
important, though probably not crucial element was that interest had been paid on
the note for a time.
34 Beach v. First M.E. Church, 96111. 177 (i88o).
-5 Pratt v. Trustees, 93 Ill. 475 (1879).
36 In re Estate of Wheeler, 284111. App. 132, 1 N.E. (2d) 425 (1936).
37 Id. at 145 (N.E. at 43):
"The statements of the receipts and disbursements show that the current income had so
decreased by 1933 that the income from the endowment fund became a vital factor in carrying
on the religious and charitable work of the church. The trustees say that, relying on the validity of the pledges to the endowment fund, they have carried on the work of the church in face
of declining current income .....
"We hold .... that there was a sufficient consideration by reason of the expenditure of
money in carrying on the work of the church in reliance on the endowment fund..... "
32

33 An
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The court further indicated that in the continued operation of the
charity, there is sufficient reliance for enforcing the payment of sums
designed to maintain that operation in the future. 38 The logical justification may be that the charity, had it known of the future default, might
have husbanded its resources and curtailed its operations so as to have
sufficient funds for future expenses. The argument might also be made
with regard to the promise to contribute to the purchase of a bell, that
relying on the promise and not expecting to have to pay for the bell out
of revenue, the usual rather than curtailed expenditures were made, therefore even though the bell was not bought or contracted for before the
39
promise was withdrawn, liability should be enforced.
The court in the Wheeler case has thus suggested that there should be
an inference of reliance in favor of any going charity.40 This seed, if the
Wheeler case is an influence in the law, may be expected to develop, with
proper handling, so that soon the inference of reliance might well become
an almost conclusive presumption.
A word about the promissory estoppel doctrine in non-charity cases.
If the necessary reliance is reduced to the minimum in charity cases, will
cases involving promises for non-charitable purposes, subscription or
otherwise, follow, and if so, will not the conception of consideration be
outmoded? The Illinois courts have cited charitable and non-charitable
subscription cases indiscriminately, and on the same authority the
appellate court has sustained recovery on a non-subscription, non-charitable promise.41 It is hard to believe that the courts in later years have
not been more concerned with the necessities of charities than with the
justifiability of reliance or even with the existence of actual reliance.
There seems no reason of policy for not scrutinizing these latter elements
more carefully in non-charitable cases. The i ference of reliance may
eventually be the method for making a distincton between charitable and
38

There is an intermediate situation: current operations might be expanded or otherwise

change materially in reliance upon the promised sum, e.g., additional personnel contracts
might be entered into or tuition lowered. It could be argued that these are just as much reliance as building. See Friedline v. Board of Trustees, 23 Ill.
App. 494 (1887). Such situations
might be readjusted more easily if the promised sum were not forthcoming. See note 35 supra.
However, this would be a much stronger case for recovery than where current operations have
continued without change.
Cf. Pratt v. Trustees, 93 Ill.
475 (1879).
40Citing In re Estate of Griswold, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N.W. 6og (1925); see also Irwin v.
Lombard, 56 Ohio St. 9,46 N.E. 63 (1897); First Presbyterian Church v. Dennis, 178 Iowa
1352, i6i N.W. 183 (I17); cf. Beatty v. Illinois, 177 Ill.
280,.52 N.E. 432 (i898).
4XSwitzer v. Gertenbach, 122 Ill.
App. 26 (io5). The leading case is Ricketts v. Scothor,
57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (i898).
39
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non-charitable subscription cases. The Wheeler case, however, is too slim
a premise for concluding that the more restricted promissory estoppel doctrine, as worked out by many Illinois decisions, is no longer the limit of
enforceability.
Prior to the Wheeler case, promises to subscribe had been enforced
almost exclusively on a promissory estoppel as distinguished from a consideration basis. The statement in an early case 4 that the labor of getting
subscriptions was sufficient consideration for the promise to give has been
considered overruled by the Pratt and Beach cases. 43 The Wheeler case,
however, allegedly based its decision as much upon true consideration for
the promise as upon reliance. The court found consideration for the decedent's promise in the promises and payments of others and in the
"offer" of the church as expressed in the resolution which inaugurated the
drive to receive any money given, to hold it in trust in perpetuity and to
use the income for only certain of its purposes. 44 Because almost any
charitable subscription case could be so presented as to involve similar
considerations, the court's position deserves close scrutiny.
In holding that the promises of the various pledgors, all of whom subscribed separately, were mutual and that the promises or payments of subsequent subscribers were consideration, the court seems to rely upon a
fictitious interpretation of the facts.45 If any contract exists, it is between
the charity and the subscriber. However the action of one charitably
minded person may influence another, their separate promises are each
direct to the charity and can hardly be termed mutual promises in consideration of each other.46 They are neither made to each other nor bar42 Kentucky Baptist Education Society v. Carter, 72 Ill. 247 (1874). The labor of getting
subscriptions should be sufficient if bargained for as consideration. But this would rarely be
the case. i Williston, Contracts § 112 (2d ed. 1936).
43 Augustine v. Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Society, 79 Ill. App. 452 (i898). Cutwright v. Preachers Aid Society, 271 Ill. App. 168 (i933).
44 The income could be used for local religious needs as distinguished from the church's
missionary or charitable activities. The court considered the subscription reciting the considerations referred to in the text an acceptance of the offer. The court implied the promise to
receive the gift. See note 51 infra.
45It is not clear that the court was not merely applying promissory estoppel on the theory
that the subsequent payments by other subscribers were expenditures in reliance on the now
defendant's promise. But since these donors neither expected nor were intended to be reimbursed by the Wheeler payment, the essence of the hardship that promissory estoppel was
designed to remedy is absent and the doctrine is inapplicable. Note that Restatement requires
reliance by the promisee for promissory estoppel. Rest., Contracts § 9o (1932), quoted in
note 9 supra.
46 See Merchants Improvement Co. v. Chicago Exchange Bldg. Co., 210 I11. 26, 33, 71
N.E. 22, 26 (1904). To subsequent pledgors the prior pledge would be past or executed and so
no consideration, since their pledges are not enforceable for lack of consideration, they could
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gained for; two requisites for consideration in bilateral contracts.

47

It is

significant that, although numerous subscriptions have been present in
almost every Illinois case, no court has ever relied on the point before. Besides, a recent appellate court decision has expressly denied the sufficiency
48
of such consideration.
Regarding as consideration the agreement to receive the funds, to act
as trustee thereof, and to use the income only for certain of the promisees'
purposes seems to conflict with the rule that gratuitous promises,49 even
to create a trust,50 are unenforceable. For there should be little difficulty
in either finding or implying a promise to receive the benefit if this may be
called consideration for the promise to give.5' The difficulty is not in finding or implying such a promise, it is in finding-any reasonable ground for
52
the assertion that there really was a bargain struck between the parties,
3
and it is, further, in making such a promise qualify as consideration5
hardly make the prior pledge enforceable. See i Williston, Contracts § io3e. (2d ed. 1936).
Of course, as heretofore pointed, if subscribers promise each other for the benefit of a charity
or an individual, an enforceable third party contract may arise.
47 See i Williston, Contracts §ix6 (2d ed. 1936).
48 In Cutwright v. Preachers Aid Society, 271 Ill.
App. i68 (1933), the promise was expressed
to be "in consideration of others subscribing." The court said at p. 171, "There was no consideration of any kind for the execution of the instrument, except that expressed on the face
of the instrument, which expresses no consideration." The Board of Tax Appeals, however,
considers a charity's claim on such consideration to be valid in determining the net estates of
decedents. Edna F. Hays, d. al., Extrs. (B.T.A. 1936).
49 Richardson v. Richardson, 148 Ill.
563, 36 N.E. 6o8 (1893); Kelly v. Dyer, 359 Ill.
46,
194 N.E. 255 (1935) (note held by charity).
soSwitzer v. Skiles, 8 Ill.
529, 535 (1846); McCartney v. Ridgway, i6o Ill. 129, 155, 43 N.E
826, 835 (1896).
51 Such an agreement might easily be implied from the acceptance of the signed subscription. See i Williston, Contracts § goa (2d ed. x936). The Wheeler case distinction of all previous Illinois cases whether or not liability was sustained because "in none of these cases appeared any promise by the donee or charity to do anything" (284 Ill. App. 132, 140, 1 N.E.
(2d) 425, 428) seems irrelevant. In addition it is untrue since the promises of the church were
solely as to funds received; thus, the court was forced to imply the promise to receive the funds,
even in this case.
s2If an actual bargain was based upon the consideration stated it should have been sustained. Rest., Contracts § 84a (1932). The courts generally will not consider the adequacy of
a bargained-for consideration. Guyer v. Warren, 175 Ill. 328, 335, 51 N.E. 58o (i898); i Williston, Contracts § ii5 (2d ed. 1936). Nevertheless, finding that a promise to accept a gift is
bargained-for in exchange for a promise to give, seems both a stretch of the imagination and a
'reductio ad absurdurn of the requirement of consideration in bilateral contracts. See Ballantine,
Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and Illogical? ii Mich. L. Rev. 423 (1913).
53Mutual promises are not the only requirement for a bilateral contract. If the performance promised is not enforceable, or if it is not sufficient consideration, neither is a promise of
such performance sufficient. See i Williston, Contracts § io3b (2d ed. 1936).
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There is room for doubt that the performance promised by a church in
agreeing to use funds for certain of its purposes can qualify as detriment
inasmuch as by law religious corporations are already in this state bound
to hold gifts upon the terms given s4 This same duty is imposed on charities generally without a statute on ordinary trust principlesss The court
in the TVhecler case felt nonetheless that there was detriment because of
the promise to conserve the principal and to use the income for but some
of its purposes, relying on section 84(c) of the Restatement of Contracts
which provides that if the act promised "differs in any way from what
was previously due," it is sufficient. Reflection however, will show that
the promised act did not differ in any way from the duty to use the gift
for the purpose given 6 and that the promise of the charity being merely to
S
fulfill its obligation was therefore questionable consideration.'
Another pertinent approach in testing the soundness of the opinion is to
consider the rights that were created in the promisor. It is axiomatic that
in a bilateral contract as the court considered this to be, both parties must
be bound on the acceptance or neither is. s 8 There must be enforceable
rights created in each party by virtue of the contract. The fact of the
existence of such rights may be tested by considering first the situation
after the funds have been paid to the church, and then the situation before actual payment but after the alleged contract had been completed by
offer and acceptance.5 9
54Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, C. 32, § 173. The duty is of course owed to the members of
the congregation as well as to the public generally. It follows that if there was no detriment to
the church because this duty was owed, there was no benefit to the obligee because she was
previously entitled to the promised performance. i Williston, Contracts § 202, I02a (2d ed.
I936).
ss Attorney General v. Illinois Agricultural College, 85 Ill. 516 (,877); Northwestern Univ.
v. Wesley Memorial Hospital, 290 Ill. 205, 225 N.E. I3 (Igxg); State v. Toney, 141 Ore. 4o6,
17 P. (2d) 1105 (1933); 2 Perry, Trusts and Trustees, § 733 ( 7 th ed. 1929).
s6 This is the reason given for denying tort liability. Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 228 Ill.
381, 75 N.E. 991 (2905).
57 See South Park Comm'rs v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 286 Ill. 5o4, 5o9,122 N.E. 89,92 (2919);

Rienzi Co. v. Comm'rs of Lincoln Park, 198 Ill. App. 218, 232 (1916); 17 re Smith Estate, 69
Vt. 382, 38 Atl. 66 (897). "In the absence of special circumstances, we fail to see how a duty
to apply the fund to a particular corporate purpose can better serve as a consideration than
a duty to apply it to corporate purposes not specified. The duty in either case is implied."
Johnson v. Otterbein Univ., 41 Ohio St. 527, 531 (i88s); and see note 55 supra. But see Irwin
v. Lombard Univ., 56 Ohio St. 9, 46 N.E. 63 (2897); and cases collected in 38 A.L.R. 878
(r925). Cf. Thompson v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Ill. 379 (1866).
58 Vogel v. Pekoc, 157 Ill. 339, 42 N.E. 386 (i895). See i Williston, Contracts § 203(e)
(2d ed. 1936).

s9 This reverse procedure is adopted because the court considered only the first point at
any length and because from the conclusion that there are no enforceable rights after payment,
a similar conclusion as to the situation prior in time is necessary.
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Examining the first situation, could the promisor have compelled performance of the obligation of the church to hold and administer the endowment fund as it had agreed to do? The court admitted the importance
of this question and confidently answered the question in the affirmative. 6°
Two cases are cited in support, neither of which is in point.6' In the
Green case, the court enforced a provision in a gift for a reverting to the
heirs of the donor if the property given was not used as specified. There
was no such reverter provided for in the Wheeler case. In addition, this is
clearly not enforcing the performance of the obligation to administer the
fund. In the other case,6 in which there was also no reverter provided for,
the same bench as sat in the Wheeler case refused to allow a contributor to
a fund to enforce its proper administration or to get his money back.
There is no indication that this case is overruled. It is devoted largely to
6
distinguishing the principle invoked in the Green case. 3
The only other case cited, the Allegheny College case, 64 was one in which
a college enforced a subscription, hardly a strong case for proving the
rights of the subscriber against the college. Without spelling it out, the
court there did indicate that a duty was owed to the promisor to perpetuate her name in connection with a promised scholarship fund. The resulting gratification of "the longing for posthumous remembrance" was the
reason for holding that the promises were mutual consideration. This
dictum,6s amounting to no more than an intimation as to the enforceability
of the non-charitable feature of the agreement, is weak support indeed for
the assertion in the Wheeler case that the strictly charitable promises of
the church could be enforced by a subscriber.
The question of whether rights were created in the subscriber on her
"acceptance" and before payment must be answered in the negative for
surely a prospective donor has no greater rights than one who has already
6o 284 Ill. App. 132, 142, 1 N.E. (2d) 425, 429 (1936).
61Green v. Old People's Home, 269 Ill.134, 1o9 N.E. 701 (i915); Allegheny College v.

Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
62 Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165 (1932).
63 In the Smith case the court said at p. 168: ". . . . we are of the opinion that a contribu-

tor to a fund creating a trust for public charitable purposes where, under no circumstances, is
there any right of reverter and the contribution is made without reservation, has no right to
call the trustees of the fund to account for a misapplication of the funds or any other breach of
the trust."
64 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).

65Id. at 375 (N.E., at 275): "More is involved in the receipt of such a fund than in the mere
acceptance of money to be held to a corporate use .....
Again, at 337 (N.E. at 176): "A
duty to act in ways beneficial to the promisor and beyond the application of the fund to the
mere uses of the trust would be cast upon the promisee by acceptance of the money.
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contributed" and it is clear, therefore, that she would not be able to institute suit if the church refused to receive the sums promised.
As long as charitable subscription cases are decided on promissory
estoppel principles, the inroads upon consideration can at least be studied
and to some extent predicted. Even an arbitrary rule that reliance by a
charity is conclusively presumed would have the virtue of certainty and
definiteness and, it would seem, should give charities almost complete
protection. Promissory estoppel is at least a direct attack on the necessity
of consideration. When the court's determination to protect the expectations of charities leads them to begin chipping from within at the principles of consideration, however, confusion is promoted not only in cases involving promises to charities but in other cases involving the principles
which have thus been distorted.
It is too early to predict that the Illinois law will follow this course.
Any court not inclined to follow the Wheeler case has, as has been shown,
ample opportunity to find authority as well as reason for its purpose.
6See

note 62 supra.

